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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the impact of three major policy shifts in federal crop insurance on 
North Dakota agriculture production efficiency.  An empirical application of 53 counties in 
North Dakota from 1980 to 2014 indicates that “with crop insurance”, the technical efficiency of 
agriculture is higher as compared to “without crop insurance”.  This finding implies that 
producers are utilizing their input resources more effectively and are increasing the use of 
technology efficiently in their operations with crop insurance.  The results are important to 
policy makers as it proves that with government support, the federal crop insurance program is 
not only mitigating risk for producers but also allowing producers to use resources efficiently; 
the program is ensuring producers will continue to lead the world as low-cost producers of food, 
fiber, and fuel for the American public. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Federal crop insurance has been an effective risk management tool used by producers in 
North Dakota and across the United States for the last two decades.  In recent years, crop 
insurance has become the safety net of choice among farm programs for producers in North 
Dakota. Federal crop insurance protects the insured crop from perils which may reduce yield, 
including drought, wind, lightning, tornado, hail, insects, excessive moisture, and hurricanes.  In 
addition to production risk, most plans have a price and resulting revenue component in the 
coverage.  Therefore, today’s crop insurance is a comprehensive risk management tool, which 
allows producers to manage the inherent risk in agriculture. 
Multi-peril crop insurance has a long history in the United States beginning in 1899 when 
it was first introduced by a private company, The Realty Revenue Guaranty Company of 
Minneapolis, Minnesota.  This attempt at all-risk crop insurance was not repeated the following 
year.  In 1917, crop insurance was provided by three companies in North Dakota, South Dakota, 
and Montana.  High indemnities were paid as the geographic pool of insured was too small to 
avoid drought.  Revenue insurance was offered by the Hartford Fire Insurance Company in 1920. 
The company’s indemnities exceeded premium by $1.7 million due to a decline in crop prices. 
Several other companies unsuccessfully attempted to provide private crop insurance. 
The first federal investigation into crop insurance was led by the Republican minority 
leader, Senator Charles McNary of Oregon in 1922.  In the same year, the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) calculated crop losses totaling $2.6 billion from 1909 to 
1918.  After several years of discussion and failed government attempts to provide risk reduction 
tools to producers, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 in Title V provided for federal crop 
insurance.  Within the USDA, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) was created to 
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administer the program to provide protection not only against price and income variation, but 
also from the great depression.  Initially, the only covered crop was wheat with a coverage level 
of 50% or 75% of an individual farmer’s average yield based on historical yield data.  Premiums 
were based on historical data, which would have equaled indemnities if the program had been in 
place in previous years.  The first year of crop insurance was disappointing as indemnities 
greatly exceeded premiums, approximately one-third of insured growers received loss payments, 
and the loss ratio was 1.52.  Poor administration of the program and lack of data were the main 
reasons for the lack of success for the first year of the program. 
Participation in crop insurance was voluntary and lackluster, thus to increase the 
participation of producers in crop insurance, new policies and amendments to policies were 
proposed in 1940, 1977, 1980, 1996, 2000, 2002 and 2008.  The USDA created the Risk 
Management Agency (RMA) in 1996 to administer the public-private crop insurance program 
for the FCIC. 
There have been three major shifts in modern crop insurance policy: Increase 
participation with catastrophic crop insurance (CAT) from 1980 to1993, shift from yield to 
revenue insurance1 (REV) from 1994 to1999, and coverage level subsidies2 (COV) from 2000 to 
2014. These are the three shifts in crop insurance policy this research will study. 
                                                 
1 There are two general types of crop insurance: revenue-based and yield-based. Yield-based insurance products 
cover risk to yield loss and pay an indemnity when the yield is below the APH coverage level.  Catastrophic coverage 
is the most basic type of yield-based insurance which covers at 50% of APH and 55% of estimated market price. Buy-
up yield based coverage is available for 50-75% of yield and 55-100% of price (Shields 2010). In 2014, revenue-
based policies accounted for 77% of insurance policies in which premium were paid compared to 23% for yield-based 
policies. An insured revenue level is calculated upon the yield history and expected market prices; an indemnity 
payment would be received when the actual revenue falls below the insured revenue level (Shields 2015). 
 
2 Coverage level subsidy rates have steadily increased since 1980 when the 65% coverage level was subsidized at 30%; 
in 1994, the subsidy was 41.7%; and in 2000, the subsidy was 59% (Glauber, Collins 2002). Among all policies in 
2014, the average subsidy rate was 62% (Shields 2015). In 2013, North Dakota producers received approximately 10% 
or over $700 million of the total $7.3 billion in premium subsidies, which placed North Dakota first among states in 
receiving premium subsidies. Nationwide participation in the federal crop insurance program totaled 294 million acres 
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The CAT policy shift began with The Federal Crop Insurance Improvement Act of 1980. 
Crop insurance prior to 1980 mainly provided protection again catastrophic coverage for 
producers.  In the CAT policy shift, there was an emphasis on increasing participation by 
increasing subsides for crop insurance premiums, and introducing optional, basic, and enterprise 
unit policies that would provide protection at a disaggregate level.  In addition, the public-private 
partnership was established in which the private insurance companies would sell and service 
federal crop insurance to the producer (Kramer 1983). 
The REV policy shift began with The Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 and 
was the first meaningful change to crop insurance since 1980.  Policy makers preferred crop 
insurance as an ex ante disaster program versus an ex post disaster assistance.  Catastrophic risk 
protection covered 50% of the actual production history (APH) and 60% of the commodity price 
was provided without a premium to the farmer.  In addition, subsides were increased for crop 
insurance buy-up policies, which provided coverage levels greater than 50% (Glauber 2004). 
These changes were intended to increase crop insurance participation rates, which had remained 
below 25% prior to 1990, but reached 40% in 1990 and 1991 (Coble, Knight, Pope, Williams 
1996). Producers continued to rely on ex post disaster relief for risk management, due to their 
low participation rate in crop insurance.  Beginning in 1993 and expanded by the 1994 
legislation, additional crop insurance products were made available. Revenue coverage was 
introduced in 1997. 
The COV policy shift began with The Agricultural Risk Protection Act of 2000.  Crop 
insurance was enhanced and modified which encouraged further participation by continuing 
                                                 
in 2014. Subsidy increases have been key to increasing enrollment in the crop insurance program allowing it to be a 
viable risk management tool for producers while reducing the need for additional disaster assistance. 
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to increase subsidy levels for buy-up levels of coverage. Additional crop insurance products 
were made available along with the higher premium subsidy levels providing producers 
multiple options to insure their crops (Glauber, Collins 2002). 
The emphasis of crop insurance participation, types of crop insurance policies (yield 
versus revenue), and coverage level subsidies on the effectiveness as a risk management tool 
has been the primary focus of policy makers and producers.  Further, most of the earlier and 
current crop insurance studies focused on the micro-level issues associated with crop insurance 
demand, premium rate, and asymmetric information due to adverse selection and moral hazard 
issues. Minimal and inadequate research exists to explain the overall general effect crop 
insurance has on agriculture production. 
The outcome of this study will provide information to individual producers to reflect 
upon the efficiency of their operation and utilization of resources to maximize agriculture 
production. The implications of changes in the crop insurance policies over time will provide 
information for policy makers with respect to types of crop insurance, coverage levels and 
subsidies. United States taxpayers will appreciate the research, as they subsidize nearly 70% of 
crop insurance premiums. 
Traditionally, producers measure success by production, cost, profit, and operate to 
maximize production or reduce cost.  However, those measures do not show if the farm is 
operating on its theoretical production frontier.  If the farm is operating on the theoretical 
production frontier, the farm will be 100% efficient and maximizing the use of input resources. 
It is assumed with the availability of crop insurance, there is reduced risk to production; 
however, it is unknown if producers have increased or decreased their production efficiency in 
utilizing a fixed set of input resources. The concept of production efficiency was introduced by 
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Farrell (1957) and is defined as the distance of the observation from the production frontier and 
measured by the observed output to realized output, i.e., output that could be produced if the 
farm was 100% efficient from a given set of inputs.  Given, the public-private nature of crop 
insurance, did net crop insurance (NCI) increase or decrease producers’ production efficiency?  
If NCI increased producers’ efficiency, the program not only protects producers at the time of 
risk, but also enabled the producers to efficiently utilize input resources.  Alternatively, if NCI 
decreased producers’ efficiency, the program may be protecting producers at the time risk, 
while creating inefficiencies in the utilization of input resources.  This research aims to 
discover if NCI is increasing or decreasing producer efficiency.   
In this research, a heteroscedasticity stochastic frontier production function model is used 
to examine the importance of Federal Crop Insurance on the production efficiency of North 
Dakota Agriculture.  The stochastic frontier production function not only evaluates the 
importance of input resource, but also estimates the efficiency of the firm (in our case, the 
individual counties). The results are presented based on an empirical application to the North 
Dakota agriculture county data from 1980 to 2014. The outcome of this research will provide the 
production efficiency of the 53 counties in the state of North Dakota for the three shifts in crop 
insurance policy; and estimate the importance of net crop insurance (NCI) on production 
efficiency.  NCI is defined as the difference between potential indemnities, producer premiums 
and federal government premium subsidies. 
The three objectives of this study include 
 
1. Estimate the agriculture production efficiency of North Dakota by county. 
 
2. Evaluate the importance of NCI on agriculture production efficiency by county in 
North Dakota. 
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3. Evaluate the importance of shifts in crop insurance policies on agriculture production 
efficiency of North Dakota Counties. 
The primary objective utilizes a stochastic frontier production function3 is to estimate the 
importance of input resource in producing agriculture output in North Dakota. The second 
objective evaluates the importance of NCI on agriculture production efficiency using a 
heteroskedastic stochastic frontier production function.  Finally, the third objective is to evaluate 
the importance of crop insurance on agriculture production efficiency with an emphasis on three 
major shifts in crop insurance policies. 
Given the lack of historical farm level crop insurance, input and output production data, 
this analysis used historical county level data to address these issues. 
This research is organized as follows: the second chapter is the literature review, the 
theoretical model to jointly estimate the technical efficiency measure and primal production 
function is presented in chapter three. The fourth chapter presents the data and construction of 
the variables used in the analysis. The empirical application and results are presented in the fifth 
chapter followed by conclusions in chapter six. 
 
                                                 
3 The stochastic frontier model, introduced by Aigner, Lovell, Schmidt; Meeusen, van den Broeck; and Battesse and 
Cora in 1977 decomposes the error term,   into random error, v  and u  inefficiency.  Stochastic frontier analysis has 
become a popular tool to model the production relationship between input and output quantities and has been primarily 
used to estimate the technical efficiency of firm.  Since it was introduced in 1977, the stochastic frontier analysis has 
been evolving theoretically with surge in empirical application.  In 1982, Jondrow, Materov, Lovell, and Schmidt 
suggested a method to estimate firm specific inefficiency measures.   Furthermore, progress has been made on 
extending to fixed effects, random effects and random parameters panel models, time invariant and time variant 
models, correcting for heteroskedasticity and heterogeneity and alternative distributions (normal- half normal, normal-
exponential and normal-gamma) of u technical efficiency term.  Additionally, research has investigated the influence 
of a broader set of determinants of technical efficiency, namely geographic variables, market structure conduct and 
performance hypothesis, policy variables and size of the firm. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Federal crop insurance began in 1938 as a fully government operated insurance program 
protection against yield loss without premium subsidies.  Since 1980, the program has evolved 
into partnership between the federal government and private insurance companies with an array 
of insurance products including yield and revenue protection with substantial premium subsidies. 
Crop insurance has become a great risk management tool for producers; however, the 
government policy struggle continues over the appropriate role of government.  New weather or 
area-yield based policies may provide alternative options (Barnett 2000). 
The federal government and policy-makers continually struggle with how to successfully 
manage risk in agriculture and reduce government outlays.  A major effort behind the Federal 
Crop Insurance Act of 1980 was to subsidize crop insurance, thus eliminating disaster programs. 
Such a policy direction, in theory, would expand risk management coverage and reduce 
government costs.  Adoption and participation in crop insurance was slow and in 2001 reached 
210 million acres from 26 million acres in 1980. From 1980 to 2000, outlays for disaster 
programs continued and totaled $15 billion, but crop insurance indemnities totaled $22 billion. 
Crop insurance has thus far failed to fully replace disaster programs (Glauber and Collins 2002). 
Expected utility maximization is not realized when producers choose their crop insurance 
coverage level.  Babcock (2015) applied cumulative prospect theory to crop insurance choices by 
framing it as an individual investment.  A loss occurs if the premium paid is higher than the 
indemnity received. 
Goodwin, Vandeveer, and Deal (2004) investigated the effect crop insurance has on 
acreage of corn and soybeans in the Corn Belt and wheat and barley in the Upper Great Plains. 
Results indicated that higher crop insurance participation rates resulted in statistically significant, 
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but minimal acreage shifts.  Crop insurance premium subsides of 30% increased acres from 0.2% 
to 1.1%. 
Hennessy, Babcock, and Hayes (1997) compared crop revenue insurance to the efficiency 
of the 1990 farm program.  Revenue insurance only provides subsides when revenue is low, 
marginal utility is high, and that revenue is most important.  Revenue insurance at the 75% level 
would provide the same protection as the 1990 farm program with a 75% decrease in cost. 
Coble, Knight, Pope, and Williams (1996) investigated farm-level crop insurance demand 
with panel data for Kansas wheat farms utilizing a random-effects, binomial probit model. The 
price elasticity of demand was found to be inelastic at -0.65.  Adverse selection was not 
supported as pre-season weather variables were not significant. 
Goodwin and Vado (2007) investigated the justification for government involvement in 
crop insurance and farm disaster programs.  A panel VAR analysis was conducted between 
market returns and the three type of farm program payments: crop insurance, disaster assistance, 
and direct payments.  An interesting result is that crop insurance and disaster assistance imply 
higher levels of market income risk.  This result is consistent with the thought that increased risk 
in agriculture is attributed to subsidized crop insurance and disaster assistance.  Private insurance 
may be able to provide viable coverage, but would be smaller and more specialized. 
O’Donoghue, Roberts, and Key (2008) investigated how the 1994 Federal Crop 
Insurance Reform Act with increased subsidies altered the level of diversification of United 
States farms. Farm-specific changes were tracked over time and the relationship between 
average returns and farm diversification were estimated. Farm specialization increased modestly 
and as did production efficiency; however, the efficiency gains were significantly less than the 
crop insurance subsidies. 
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Reinsurance is required by private crop insurance markets as weather risk has a high 
correlation to farm-level yields; this defeats attempts at pooling risks across farms. Miranda and 
Glauber (1997) find that crop insurance is 20 to 50 times riskier than if farm yields were 
stochastically independent.  Area yield reinsurance policies would allow for coverage of 
systemic crop loss risk, resulting in risk exposure experience by conventional property liability 
insurance companies. 
In the frontier production function, Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977) define the 
disturbance term as the sum of symmetric normal and (negative) half-normal random variables. 
Tests of the model had small one-sided disturbance, indicating high levels of efficiency relative 
to a stochastic frontier. 
Shaik (2015) investigated the importance of short- and long-run liquidity or debt risk on 
technical inefficiency and productivity.  An alternative panel estimator of normal-gamma 
stochastic frontier model is applied using a simulated maximum likelihood estimation technique. 
Results indicate a difference in the parameter coefficients of gamma stochastic production 
function, and heterogeneity function variables between the pooled and the Swamy–Arora panel 
models. Variance in efficiency and productivity is explained by the short-run and long-run risk 
or variations in liquidity or debt-servicing ratio. 
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CHAPTER 3.  ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
A primal production theory assumes a relationship between non-allocable exogenous input 
vector ( )x  in logs and technology used in the production of an endogenous aggregate output ( )y  
in logs. The empirical production function with error ( )  is represented as: 
  ;y f  x β . (1) 
The primal production function is estimated using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) that 
decomposes the traditional error ( )  into a symmetrical random error ( )v  and a one-sided error or 
inefficiency ( )u . SFA was introduced in 1977 by Aigner Lovell and Schmidt (normal-half normal 
and an exponential distribution), Meeusen and van den Brubeck (exponential distribution), and 
Bates and Corra, that decomposes the error term, ò  into a symmetrical random error, ( )v  and a one-
sided error or inefficiency ( )u . 
The stochastic frontier model for primal production function is represented as: 
  ;y f v u  x β  (2) 
where ( )y  represents an endogenous dependent variable in logs, (x) is a vector of exogenous 
independent inputs in logs and deterministic time trend used in the production function; β  is a 
vector of coefficients associated with inputs. 
Since its introduction in 1977, SFA has been evolving theoretically with a surge in 
empirical application. The last decade saw the introduction of fixed-effects and random parameters 
SFA panel models and time invariant and time variant models. These advancements corrected for 
heteroskedasticity/heterogeneity and alternative distributions (half normal, exponential, or 
truncated normal distribution) of technical efficiency term ( )u . Additionally, research has 
investigated the influence of a broader set of determinants of technical efficiency namely 
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geographic variables, market structure conduct and performance hypothesis, policy variables and 
size of the firm on inefficiency. 
Equation (2) can be extended by introducing heterogeneity in the one-sided inefficiency 
( )u  to evaluate the importance of crop insurance on the performance (efficiency) of agriculture 
production. The extended model is defined as: 
 
 
 2u
;
exp z
f v uy
 




x β
 (3) 
where (
2
u  ) is the variance of inefficiency and modelled as a function of risk or variance in (z) 
variables including short-run and long-run NCI. The inefficiency variances in equation (3) can be 
paraphrased as variance in inefficiency and defined as: 
 
 
 2u
;
exp z
f v u Output
Inefficiency
y
 


 

x β
. (4) 
In this research, the random effect4 (tre) panel stochastic frontier production function is 
represented as: 
   , ;it i it ity f w v u   x β  (5) 
where iw  is time invariant firm specific random term. 
The main difference between the panel random and panel fixed model is the additional 
assumption that iw  and all other variables are uncorrelated. Combining equation (4) and (5) gives 
the following: 
                                                 
4 Alternatively, the fixed effect (tfe) panel stochastic frontier model can also be used. The fixed effect model is 
represented as  , ;it i it ity f v u  x β , where i  is the cross-section (or county) specific constant. 
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  
 2inefficiency
, ;
exp z
it i it ity f w v u
 


 

x β
 (6) 
Equation (6) will be used in the estimation of a) input elasticities of production function, b) 
evaluate the importance of NCI (short-run and long-run variance) on technical efficiency variance, 
and c) change in the impact of NCI across the three major shifts in crop insurance policy. 
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CHAPTER 4.  DATA SOURCES AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE VARIABLE5 
 
 
The USDA’s Economic Research Service constructs and publishes the state and 
aggregate production accounts for the farm sector. The United States Department of Commerce's 
Bureau of Economic Analysis publishes county level production accounts for the farm sector 
including revenue of outputs and cost of input resources. To estimate the primal production 
function, theory suggests the use of output and input quantities. The log difference in output, d ln 
IOQ is computed as: 
d ln IOQ d ln Revenue d ln OPI (7)
 
where the logarithmic change in output price index is d ln OPI  and the logarithmic change in 
 
revenue is d ln Revenue. The implicit output quantity index (IOQ) is computed using d ln IOQ 
 
and choosing first year as 100.  The log difference in output, d ln IOQ  is computed as: 
 
d ln IIQ d lnCost d ln IPI (8) 
 
where the logarithmic change in input price index d ln IPI and the logarithmic change in cost is 
 
d lnCost . The implicit input quantity index (IIQ) is computed as using d ln IIQ and choosing 
first year as 100. 
The input price index and output price index used in the analysis are unique, as the 
 
national price indices are used to compute individual county price indexes.  For example, assume 
a county produces crops and livestock.  To develop county specific price index, the share of crop 
revenue and livestock revenue are used to weight the national crop price index and national 
livestock price index, respectively. The county specific input price index (IPI ) is computed as: 
 
                                                 
5 This is taken from Shaik, 2013 and 2015. 
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 
 
1
1
1
1
* ln
* ln
C C
t t
L L
t t
t
t
t
t
r
CPI
IPI
r
CPI
rs s
LPI
rs s
LPI




  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 (9) 
 
where CPI and LPI are the national crop price index and livestock price index; rs
C
 
 
and rs
L
 
are the revenue shares of crops and livestock. 
 
The price index approach uses the ratio between the weighted growth rate of crop and the 
weighted growth rate of livestock, as a measure of price gain between any two points in time. An 
index of price is computed by choosing first year as 100; a similar approach is used in the 
computation of four input price indexes.  The county specific input price indexes for the four 
inputs also were developed in a similar fashion by using county specific input cost share weights. 
The county specific input and output price indexes were used in the computation of implicit 
input quantity index (IIQ) and implicit output quantity index (IOQ), respectively. 
An aggregate implicit output quantity index and four implicit input quantity index 
variables (capital, labor, farm inputs, and manufactured inputs) are used in the estimation. An 
aggregate agriculture implicit output quantity (IOQ) index is computed from output cash 
receipts and a county specific output price index defined in equation (7).  Equation (8) is used in 
the computation of implicit capital, labor, farm input and manufacture input quantity indexes. 
The capital quantity index is computed from the sum of repair and operation cost of 
machinery; depreciation, interest, rent, and taxes; and other miscellaneous expenses; and county 
specific capital price index.  The labor quantity index is computed from the sum of hired 
workers' cash pay and perquisites, employers' contributions for social security and Medicare, and 
payments for contract labor, machine hire, and custom work; and county specific labor price
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index. The implicit quantity index of farm input is computed from the sum of feed, livestock, 
and seed purchases; and county specific farm input price index.  Finally, the implicit quantity 
index of manufactured input is computed from the sum of fertilizer and lime, and petroleum 
products; and county specific manufactured input price index.  Figure 1 shows the average use of 
input resources by North Dakota counties to producer agriculture output. 
With the introduction of crop insurance in the primal production framework, the three 
major components of crop insurance – producer premium, premium subsidy, and potential 
indemnity are combined to create NCI.  The crop insurance premium, indemnity and subsidy 
data were collected for all the crop insurance policies and aggregated by county and year from 
1980 to 2014. Since crop insurance is output based, output crop price index along with NCI are 
used in the computation of implicit NCI quantity index that is consistent with primal production 
theory framework. 
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CHAPTER 5.  EMPIRICAL APPLICATION AND RESULTS 
 
The three objectives are evaluated by estimating equation (5) and (6) utilizing the output 
and input implicit quantity index. The true random effects panel SFA regression results of 
equations (5) and (6) are presented in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively.  Table 4 presents the 
summary statistics of North Dakota technical efficiency measures estimated by equation (5) and 
(6) by three crop insurance shifts: CAT, REV, and COV. To illustrate the changes in technical 
efficiency over the crop insurance shifts, Figure 2 presents the average technical efficiency 
measures corresponding to the three crop insurance shifts. Table 1 presents the summary 
statistics of variable used in the regression analysis from 1980 to 2014. Figure 1 presents the 
implicit input quantity indexes for each county. 
A Cobb-Douglas6 functional form for the panel stochastic frontier models with 
heterogeneity in the one-sided inefficiency ( u ) is specified. The short-run and long-run variance 
of NCI is specified in the inefficiency heteroskedasticity variance function.  The short-run NCI 
variance is measured as the rolling variance for the last 5 years. The long-run NCI variance is 
measured as the rolling variance for the past 10 years.  The Cobb-Douglas functional form with 
heteroskedasticity is specified as: 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7
2
u 0, 1, 2, 3,
it it it it it
it it it
u u it u it u it
Output Capital Land Labor Chemicals
Energy Materials Year
i ciSRnc ciLn n R
    
   
    
    
   
   
 
(10) 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 A more flexible functional form, the Translog production function is also estimated. However, the input elasticities 
was not in the normal range with and without imposing the properties of production function including curvature 
conditions. Apart from these out of range results and the focus of the paper is to illustrate the importance of short- run 
and long-run variability in net crop insurance on efficiency. 
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Figure 1.  State maps of implicit input quantity indexes by county 
 
In the primal production function in Table 3, all inputs are significant at the 5% level 
except for seed, average precipitation, and variance precipitation.  Based on the coefficient or 
elasticity, a 10% increase in capital, labor, seed, feed, fertilizer, and energy input is expected to 
increase output production by 1.702%, 1.109%, 0.139%, 0.639%, 0.487%, and 2.249%, 
respectively.  The trend is a proxy for technology and is positivity related to agriculture output. 
The average and variance of temperature variables according to the model have a negative and 
statistically significant effect on agricultural output.  This result suggests an increase in the 
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average or variance of the temperature would decrease agriculture production. Average of 
precipitation has a positive effect on output and variance of precipitation has a negative effect 
on agriculture output; both inputs are not significant at the 5% level. 
 
Figure 2.  State maps of efficiency without crop insurance and with crop insurance by county 
 
In the technical efficiency equation of the heteroskedastic stochastic frontier production 
function of Table 3, NCI is positive for all three time periods; however, only the variation in 
REV and COV are significant at the 5% level.  These results indicate that NCI increases 
variability in technical efficiency.  In the short-run risk model, NCI has the following effects:  
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 CAT variation is positive, however insignificant,  
 REV variation is negative and insignificant, and  
 COV variation is positive and significant at the 5% level.  
These results suggest that in the short run NCI has increased variability technical efficiency over 
COV.  The long-run risk variation of crop insurance is negative across all three time periods; 
however, only significant at the 5% level over COV. The results also suggest that in the long-
run NCI reduces variability in efficiency over COV.  This is key, as producers are purchasing 
crop insurance to reduce their risk, which also will reduce their efficiency variability to 
maximize resources.  It is encouraging that these results were during the COV period, the most 
recent and reflective of current crop insurance policy. 
 The state level technical efficiency measures by crop insurance period in Table 4 presents 
an increase in technical efficiency with NCI when compared to without NCI.  For CAT, 
technical efficiency increased from 90.51% to 91.2% with NCI.  For REV, technical efficiency 
increased from 89.43% to 90.08% with NCI.  For COV, technical efficiency increased from 
88.52% to 89.35% with NCI.  For each period, the technical efficiency is higher for NCI than 
without NCI indicating that on a statewide basis, agriculture production has taken advantage of 
crop insurance along with technology changes.  Figure 3 illustrates the state mean technical 
efficiency with NCI and without NCI by major insurance shift.  These results are encouraging 
for producers, indicating that crop insurance has increased the efficiency of producers, allowing 
them to increase their utilization of input resources.  This implies that the federal crop insurance 
program is working, as it allows producers to be better stewards of their resources.  As North 
Dakota is the leading recipient of federal crop insurance premium subsidies, these results are not 
surprising. 
 20 
 
 
Figure 3. State mean technical efficiency with NCI and without NCI by major crop insurance 
shifts 
 
Table 5 presents county level technical efficiency with NCI by the three crop insurance 
shifts and the mean technical efficiency from 1980-2014.  The state mean technical efficiency of 
each shift has successively decreased.  This decreasing trend may be attributed to land 
utilization including the expansion of crops in non-traditional growing areas, such as corn 
production further north and west in North Dakota, and farming of marginal land, which had 
been pasture. This decreasing trend suggests that NCI is already built into the production 
function, and that agriculture efficiency is declining overtime.  This trend may be an indication 
of farm size and reduced efficiency due to transport time and farms covering large geographical 
areas, as farm size continues to increase in the state.  Farm equipment is often under-utilized, 
reducing efficiency due to the significant investment; however due to narrow planting and 
harvest windows, the capacity is required to prevent losses.          
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CHAPTER 6.  CONCLUSION 
 
Federal crop insurance was introduced in 1938 and over 70 years, has become the key 
risk management tool for producers across the United States replacing ad hoc disaster assistance 
programs.  The shift to crop insurance took a significant step in 1980 when the federal 
government began subsidizing crop insurance policy premiums and created a private-public 
partnership between the federal government and the private insurance companies to sell and 
administer crop insurance policies.  Participation in the program remained low until 1994 when 
premium subsidies were increased and crop insurance was required to receive additional disaster 
assistance for a few years.  In 2000, premium subsides increased again and additional revenue 
insurance policies became available. Today, crop insurance is the risk management tool of 
agriculture with 294 million acres insured across the U.S. in 2014 (Shields 2015). 
The effort of this research was to estimate the production efficiency of the 53 counties in 
the state of North Dakota and estimate the importance of net crop insurance (NCI) on 
production efficiency.  The primal production function is estimated with stochastic frontier 
analysis, which also is used to evaluate the importance of NCI on production efficiency. 
The statewide mean of the technical efficiency is higher with NCI than without NCI. 
This data suggests that crop insurance allows producers to be more efficient, utilize their input 
resources more effectively, and are increasing the use of technology.  Over the long-run, 
variation in technical efficiency is reduced with NCI implying crop insurance has long-term 
positive effects to producers’ resource utilization, as lower variability results in lower risk. 
However from 1980 to 2014, the mean state technical efficiency with crop insurance has 
decreased, indicating crop insurance is built into the production function.  Comparisons across 
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individual counties reveal a more accurate representation, as there may have been significant 
changes in the use of inputs and outputs (crops) across individual counties.       
The federal crop insurance program has become the program that policy makers have 
been attempting to achieve for decades, as it has high participation, provides high levels of 
risk reduction to producers eliminating the need for ad hoc disaster relief, and provides 
security to agricultural lenders.  In addition, this research implies that federal crop insurance 
increases the efficiency of North Dakota producers allowing them to utilize their input 
resources more effectively to be low cost producers of agricultural products for the American 
public. 
A drawback of this study is the use of county data.  Further research utilizing individual 
farm level data may provide insight into how efficiency is affected by farm size and location, 
specific crops, and other variables.  Investigation of the technical efficiency gains from the 
portion of crop insurance premiums paid by the producer and from the federal subsidy would 
show the level of benefit producers are receiving by the subsidization of the crop insurance 
policies. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of variables used in the regression analysis: 1980-2014 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Year 1855 1,997.000 10.102 1,980.000 2,014.000 
Output 1855 518.814 184.912 203.874 1,437.380 
Labor 1855 186.706 65.679 26.851 474.015 
Capital 1855 330.341 88.839 129.886 762.702 
Seed 1855 1,041.240 765.189 100.820 4,851.290 
Feed 1855 278.470 171.148 17.085 1,902.390 
Fertilizer 1855 1,305.850 699.668 108.189 5,330.150 
Energy 1855 244.859 58.761 39.291 516.140  
     
NCI 1855 245,149 927,773 0 18,107,040 
NCI_Short Run 
Risk 
1855 
208,431,085,576 1,732,110,400,000 
0 34,752,296 
NCI_Long Run 
Risk 
1855 
138,031,677,190 941,865,645,877 
0 18,159,297 
 
     
Average Temp 1855 5.438 1.553 0.433 10.667 
Variance Temp 1855 142.664 29.217 57.597 245.562 
Average Precp 1855 29.487 15.181 5.569 131.130 
Variance Precp 1855 816.526 1,226.610 11.771 18,250.610 
 
The short-run and long-run risk are defined as the second moment, i.e., variance of actual net 
crop insurance. Hence the values are very big.  This will lead to very low parameter coefficient. 
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Table 2. Panel true random effects SFA results of production function 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% Conf.Interval] 
Primal Production Function 
Capital 0.1551 0.0137 11.32 <0.0005 0.1283 0.1820 
Labor 0.0943 0.0171 5.52 <0.0005 0.0608 0.1278 
Seed 0.0257 0.0151 1.71 0.088 -0.0038 0.0553 
Feed 0.0483 0.0093 5.19 <0.0005 0.0301 0.0665 
Fertilizer 0.0293 0.0143 2.05 0.04 0.0013 0.0573 
Energy 0.1932 0.0209 9.26 <0.0005 0.1523 0.2341 
Trend 0.0267 0.0008 31.52 <0.0005 0.0251 0.0284 
Average Temp -0.0220 0.0035 -6.26 <0.0005 -0.0288 -0.0151 
Variance Temp -0.0008 0.0002 -5.14 <0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0005 
Average Precp -0.0002 0.0003 -0.52 0.601 -0.0008 0.0005 
  Variance Precp 0.0000 0.0000 0.97 0.331 0.0000 0.0000   
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Table 3. Panel true random effects SFA results of production function with heteroskedasticity 
(efficiency variance) 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>z 
Primal Production Function    
Capital 0.1702 0.0164 10.4 0 
Labor 0.1109 0.0202 5.48 0 
Seed 0.0139 0.0177 0.79 0.432 
Feed 0.0639 0.0106 6.04 0 
Fertilizer 0.0487 0.0163 3 0.003 
Energy 0.2249 0.0246 9.13 0 
Trend 0.0228 0.0010 23.34 0 
Average Temp -0.0240 0.0040 -5.99 0 
Variance Temp -0.0010 0.0002 -5.38 0 
Average Precp 0.0000236 0.0004 0.06 0.951 
Variance Precp -0.0000001 0.0000 -0.03 0.978 
 
Production Technical Efficiency Function 
 
 NCI  
CAT (1980-93) 0.000001690000 0.000000896000 1.88 0.059 
REV (1994-99) 0.000000924000 0.000000326000 2.84 0.005 
COV (2000-14) 0.000000340000 0.000000128000 2.65 0.008 
  NCI_Short Run Risk   
CAT (1980-93) 0.000000000119 0.000000000064 1.86 0.063 
REV (1994-99) -0.000000000001 0.000000000005 -0.27 0.785 
COV (2000-14) 0.000000000001 0.000000000000 2.51 0.012 
  NCI_Long Run Risk   
CAT (1980-93) -0.000000000299 0.000000000156 -1.92 0.055 
REV (1994-99) -0.000000000008 0.000000000007 -1.15 0.25 
COV (2000-14) -0.000000000002 0.000000000001 -2.54 0.011 
 
Intercept 
 
-4.5175 
 
0.1203 
 
-37.55 
 
0 
 
The short-run and long-run risk are defined as the second moment, i.e., variance of actual net 
crop insurance. Hence the values are very big.  This will lead to very low parameter coefficient. 
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Table 4. Summary statistics of technical efficiency estimated from true random effects SFA by 
major crop insurance shifts: 1980-2014 
 
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Without NCI 
CAT (1980-1993) 
Inefficiency 0.1018 0.0662 0.0240 0.5841 
Efficiency 0.9051 0.0555 0.5576 0.9762 
REV (1994-1999) 
Inefficiency 0.1156 0.0939 0.0283 1.000 
Efficiency 0.8943 0.0695 0.3460 0.9721 
COV (2000-2014) 
Inefficiency 0.1274 0.1093 0.0234 0.9396 
Efficiency 0.8852 0.0852 0.3908 0.9769 
With NCI 
CAT (1980-1993) 
Inefficiency 0.0939 0.0609 0.0159 0.5466 
Efficiency 0.9120 0.0515 0.5789 0.9842 
  REV (1994-1999)   
Inefficiency 0.1082 0.0926 0.0285 1.0000 
Efficiency 0.9008 0.0684 0.3591 0.9719 
  COV (2000-2014)   
Inefficiency 0.1174 0.1020 0.0201 0.8973 
Efficiency 0.8935 0.0803 0.4077 0.9801 
 
Due to the distributional assumptions and estimation, some of efficiency measures were higher 
than 1 at the second decimal and rounded to the first decimal. 
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Table 5. County level technical efficiency with NCI by major crop insurance shift: 1980-2014 
 
 
  County   
CAT 
(1980-93)   
REV 
(1994-99)   
COV 
(2000-14)   
Mean 
(1980-2014)   
Adams, ND 0.9030 0.8761 0.9236 0.9072 
Barnes, ND 0.9097 0.8991 0.9163 0.9107 
Benson, ND 0.9116 0.8910 0.8869 0.8975 
Billings, ND 0.9229 0.8810 0.7886 0.8582 
Bottineau, ND 0.9138 0.8337 0.8521 0.8736 
Bowman, ND 0.8750 0.8940 0.9371 0.9048 
Burke, ND 0.8705 0.8975 0.8735 0.8764 
Burleigh, ND 0.9249 0.9148 0.9057 0.9143 
Cass, ND 0.9286 0.9465 0.9218 0.9259 
Cavalier, ND 0.8767 0.8917 0.9003 0.8894 
Dickey, ND 0.9198 0.8974 0.9192 0.9157 
Divide, ND 0.8663 0.9358 0.8507 0.8715 
Dunn, ND 0.9235 0.9033 0.9068 0.9129 
Eddy, ND 0.9250 0.8935 0.8725 0.8971 
Emmons, ND 0.9043 0.9208 0.9059 0.9080 
Foster, ND 0.9324 0.9030 0.8905 0.9094 
Golden Valley, ND 0.9346 0.8968 0.8784 0.9040 
Grand Forks, ND 0.9299 0.9226 0.8896 0.9114 
Grant, ND 0.9228 0.8925 0.9221 0.9173 
Griggs, ND 0.9340 0.8806 0.8526 0.8900 
Hettinger, ND 0.8750 0.9356 0.8909 0.8922 
Kidder, ND 0.9224 0.8892 0.9228 0.9169 
LaMoure, ND 0.9028 0.9093 0.9281 0.9147 
Logan, ND 0.9107 0.8688 0.9262 0.9102 
McHenry, ND 0.9243 0.8712 0.9005 0.9050 
McIntosh, ND 0.9061 0.9023 0.9245 0.9133 
McKenzie, ND 0.9252 0.9359 0.8963 0.9147 
McLean, ND 0.8847 0.9199 0.9115 0.9022 
Mercer, ND 0.9393 0.8753 0.8891 0.9068 
Morton, ND 0.9248 0.9148 0.9125 0.9178 
Mountrail, ND 0.8941 0.9418 0.8997 0.9047 
Nelson, ND 0.9410 0.8589 0.8578 0.8913 
Oliver, ND 0.9115 0.8852 0.9026 0.9032 
Pembina, ND 0.9107 0.9446 0.9108 0.9166 
Pierce, ND 0.9182 0.8860 0.9002 0.9050 
  Ramsey, ND   0.9257   0.8747   0.8489   0.8841   
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Table 5. County level technical efficiency with NCI by major crop insurance shift: 1980-2014 
(Continued) 
 
 
 
  County   
CAT 
(1980-93)   
REV 
(1994-99)   
COV 
(2000-14)   
Mean 
(1980-2014)   
Ransom, ND 0.9115 0.9360 0.9097 0.9149 
Renville, ND 0.8767 0.8759 0.8511 0.8656 
Richland, ND 0.9337 0.9296 0.8858 0.9125 
Rolette, ND 0.9247 0.8498 0.8707 0.8924 
Sargent, ND 0.9049 0.9209 0.9209 0.9145 
Sheridan, ND 0.8920 0.9032 0.8842 0.8906 
Sioux, ND 0.9327 0.8537 0.9054 0.9075 
Slope, ND 0.9013 0.9372 0.8987 0.9064 
Stark, ND 0.9088 0.9150 0.8953 0.9041 
Steele, ND 0.9194 0.9068 0.8844 0.9022 
Stutsman, ND 0.9216 0.8978 0.9062 0.9109 
Towner, ND 0.9183 0.8693 0.8766 0.8920 
Trail, ND 0.9349 0.9305 0.8808 0.9110 
Walsh, ND 0.9222 0.9363 0.9024 0.9161 
Ward, ND 0.9183 0.9115 0.8771 0.8995 
Wells, ND 0.9019 0.8873 0.8682 0.8850 
  Williams, ND   0.8664   0.9343   0.9127   0.8979   
State Mean 0.9120 0.9008 0.8935 0.9021 
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